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THE PORTRAIT OF AN 
UNKNOWN SOUTH AFRICAN:
IDENTITY IN A GLOBAL AGE
Jean Comaroff
I. Introduction: Figuring the Nation
In September 1995, the South African National Gallery in Cape
Town staged an exhibition titled “People’s Portraits.”1 While the
aim of the show was clearly to depict an emergent nation, the
clash of images2 suggested that the national self remained unde-
fined.3 This was hardly surprising: the exhibition came at a time
of epic transition and was itself the product of collaboration
between two very different national institutions — the gallery,
which had been a window of high culture in the neocolonial
mode, and a critical newspaper, the Weekly Mail, that had long
struggled to reveal the ordinary face of a diverse, suppressed
population. As Jane Taylor notes,4 this contrast bequeathed two
inimical styles of imagining a people. One, expressing the
gallery’s sense of South Africa’s new national cultural identity,
consisted of individual portraits, representing the “people” as a
range of identities making up a multicultural aggregate. The
second, faithful to a legacy of nationalist struggle, depicted a
populace in its exemplary figures — heroes, martyrs, and ordi-
nary citizens — all of them products of a particular political his-
tory. It was an uneasy juxtaposition that sparked its share of
controversy.
This story is instructive. It captures well the problem that sur-
rounds the relation of persons and collectivities, “identity” and
“citizenship,” in a rapidly changing world, a world that strug-
gles ever more stridently over what Salman Rushdie has termed
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“Imperso-nation”5 — the process of figuring the nation in exem-
plary human form.
In the “new” South Africa, the problem poses itself in a stark,
highly contentious manner: What nation? Which face? Many
regard the issue as primarily one of ethnic identification, of pri-
mordial differences now voluntarily embraced rather than
imposed by law. Others, raised in socialist struggle, view the
post-apartheid polity as a democracy at last: a community of
newly enfranchised, universally conceived citizens, each a mem-
ber of a thoroughly modern “rainbow nation” whose unity tran-
scends all other distinctions. As I write, though, the image of
shared generic identity is increasingly being called into ques-
tion; hence the story of the “People’s Portraits” exhibition and
the argument to which it gave rise. Indeed, one of the ironies of
contemporary South Africa has been the speed with which its
people have begun to move to the beat of other advanced capi-
talist countries, even embracing a politics of difference that
recalls the most divisive features of colonial rule.
Why should this be so, especially in a population keenly
aware of the dehumanizing effects of racism? More generally,
why does the assertion of ethnicity — an assertion, that is, of
exclusive, coherent, and unambiguous identity — occur in the
“postmodern,” translocal age, an age in which selfhood is sup-
posedly unstable and global forces appear to rob local life of its
uniqueness and coherence? How is it that a sense of difference
manifests itself in a world ever more dominated by homogeniz-
ing forces, a world watching the same news, drinking the same
Coke, moving to the same electronic pulse? Does this form of
difference arise from a “clash of civilizations”? Or is it an inte-
gral dimension of the emerging global order itself, of a planetary
system at once unified and divided by identity and nationhood,
privation and privilege? Why is it that, in the era of “Jihad vs.
McWorld,”6 society itself has become so difficult to envisage as
an inclusive human order—an order composed of people capa-
ble of seeing themselves as a fraction of a generic species?
II. Continuities and Breaks
Perhaps all epochs, at their close, encourage forward and back-
ward glances. Perhaps all of them give rise to an ambiguous mix
Macalester International Vol. 4
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of nostalgia and apprehension, evoking the kind of portentous-
ness that leads us to contemplate the “end of the world as we
know it.” The late twentieth century is also the end of a millen-
nium, making the period seem yet more apocalyptic than the
fin-de-siècle 1890s, with which it otherwise shares a certain Zeit-
geist. To be sure, the world as it has evolved over the past two
decades has challenged, as never before, the vision of society
bequeathed us by the Enlightenment, making us aware that the
“modern” — with its particular definition of person and society,
citizen and nation — described a historically and culturally spe-
cific age, not the last stage in human social evolution. A growing
dis-ease with that age, and with its progressivist assumptions, is
expressed in many of the terms given to the contemporary
moment, most of them (postmodern, postcolonial, post-Fordist)
attached by a hyphen to the past. These uncertain terms suggest
less a confident march into the future than an edging backward
into the unknown. And they contrast markedly with the thrust-
ing optimism of phrases like “the new world order” or the
“global epoch.”
Both of these perspectives — backward and forward glancing
— obviously express a truth about the way our world is experi-
enced just now. Yet each is only a partial truth, an inadequate
basis for understanding the contemporary era and the place
within it of the human subject. For ours is a world that produces
both strong identification with, and alienation from, the tenets
of modern universalism, a world that seems to breed ever
greater measures of human difference as it draws humanity into
ever-tighter interdependence. One need not agree altogether
with Atlantic Monthly alarmists such as Robert Kaplan, Matthew
Connelly, and Paul Kennedy7 or with “Clash of Civilizations”
Cassandras8 to conclude that unilinear models of progress no
longer grasp the realities of a universe that is moving in many
directions at once. But these multiple movements are no more
legible if viewed from beyond the “posts,” from the fragmentary
position of postmodern and postcolonial thinkers who reject
grand histories of modernity and who see the present largely as
a radical break with the immediate past. This preoccupation
with disjuncture and distinctness blinds us to continuities and
precludes our understanding of how the present has been pro-
duced out of the past. Why have similar assertions of ethnic dif-
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ference emerged simultaneously in some parts of the world and
not in others, for example? How do these professions of differ-
ence vary from the kind of identities long conferred by the
nation-state? Why have the axioms of modern secular citizen-
ship, once framed in the language of universal rights, given way
in many places to a kind of ethnic essentialism that undercuts
such universal assumptions? Why have such apparently
counter-modern tendencies emerged under conditions of indus-
trial capitalism and within the nation-state, indeed, out of the
very forms of modernity itself?
Let me approach the matter in the broadest possible way. It
might well be argued that we are currently in the midst of a
period of radical transformation, an age of revolution, akin per-
haps to the European Age of Revolution of 1789–1848.9 That,
after all, was an era of great shifts in relations of production and
modes of communication and exchange; an era in which local
communities were drawn into more “global” systems of transac-
tion through increasing monetization, numeration, and literacy;
an era in which the free market became both the model of the
self-regulating economy and the engine of the Wealth of
Nations, not to mention the means of this-worldly salvation for
the individual citizen-worker-consumer. True, the basic institu-
tional forms of Euro-modernity had older material and political
roots. But they took definitive shape at that point, championed
by the rise of what Hobsbawm has termed the “conquering
bourgeoisie.”10
These European cultural forms presumed a world of individ-
uated human beings, each responsible for his own salvation, on
earth as in heaven. Such self-determining creatures, at least in
theory, had rights — “civil” rights, ensured not by Church or
King but by the nation-state, in whose eyes all citizens were
alike and equal. The integrity of the “modern” nation, as Ander-
son11 and others12 have shown, was a complex cultural construc-
tion. Vested in tightly bounded legal and fiscal jurisdictions, it
wielded control over the exercise of force — not least upon the
bodies of its subjects. A distinctly modern idea of “society” was
implicated in all this: society as a generic human fabrication,
resting on secure distinctions between the sacred and the secu-
lar, the private and the public, the (feminine) home and the
(masculine) workplace. The nuclear family was its basic atom,
Macalester International Vol. 4
122
04/07/97  08:03 AM      0907com2.qxd
its moral and material core, being the site where the comple-
mentary principles of gendered labor fused in the reproduction
of persons, virtue, and value.
This order, I stress, was a cultural ideal. During the Age of
Revolution it was still in formation, often the stuff of urgent
evangelical campaigns, and, in some places, of bitter contesta-
tion. Its practical arrangements were also always in conflict with
historical realities: generic humanism was rapidly and deeply
compromised by growing inequalities of class, also by the insid-
ious evolutionary racism that accompanied nineteenth-century
colonial expansion, itself complexly intertwined with categories
of sexual difference that became ever more enshrined in ideas of
biological function.
With this in mind, let me consider some of the features of our
current “new world order.” We, too, live in an epoch of radical
change with regard to the location and organization of produc-
tion, the nature of money, and the media of communication and
transaction. These shifts have drawn existing communities into
ever more translocal systems of exchange. Accelerated processes
of globalization have been marked by the speedy growth of
planetary institutions, movements, and diasporas. These also
have precedent: the late eighteenth century saw the rise in
Europe of market-driven imperialism, foreign missions, and
empires that were worldwide in their reach. Now, as then, local-
ized economic structures have been quite suddenly and dramat-
ically transcended. And commodities have invaded, with
seemingly novel intensity, domains of life once beyond their
grasp. The hidden hand of that key theorist of the earlier revolu-
tionary age, Adam Smith, has shown itself once more. The “free
market” is more assertively invoked than ever as the prime
mechanism of social and moral regulation.
Such parallels support the view of Mandel and Jameson13 that,
far from signalling a sudden rupture with the age of modernity,
the new era of globalization is yet another chapter in the long
history of capitalism, even an intensification and consolidation
of its universal reach. But all this has also been accompanied by
significant changes in technology, in the organization of produc-
tion and communication, and in patterns of wealth distribution.
These changes have disrupted many of the social arrangements
and cultural values of Euro-modernity, exposing contradictions
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long held in check by the power of bourgeois ideals. Above all,
they have challenged the sovereignty of the nation-state and the
model of civil society it presumed. Indeed, “society” itself has
become an ever more contested object, and a politics of plural,
alternative modernities is undermining the idea of one universal
order vested in the unity of the nation and its common weal.
Along with this, shifts in means and relations of production
have altered the gender and age of labor forces across the globe,
further unsettling established modernist notions of home, fam-
ily, work, and personhood. Not only is the material base of
national economies usurped by forces beyond the control of sov-
ereign parliaments, but the very organs of social and moral
reproduction, the cradles of “family values,” are themselves in
peril.
We ought to explore these features in a little more detail since
they turn out to be very significant. Globalization is a concept of
relatively recent vintage, usually used to refer to forces of new
scope and salience. In its unspecific sense, it tends to imply a
world increasingly subject to cultural and material compression,
to diverse (and grossly unequal) interdependencies, and to a
growing awareness of its one-ness.14 In this regard, again, the
phenomenon is hardly unprecedented.15 European modernity
itself presumed what Heidegger16 termed a “world picture”
(Weltbild), a composite map on which a universal history could
be staged and empires staked out. What is more, capitalist mar-
kets have always been translocal, just as nation-states have
always been embroiled in worldwide webs of relations. Even
more definitively, “modern” memory has been shaped by world
wars that have long taught grim lessons in the deadly entangle-
ment of the planet’s populations.17
Nevertheless, there are those who insist that “postmodern
globalization” differs significantly from “modern international-
ism,”18 which was largely a matter of controlled exchanges
between bounded and centered sovereign states. Postmodern
globalization, by contrast, involves relations that are first and
foremost translocal; that cut across preexisting groups, cultures,
and regions to form vast and virtual commonalities; and that
dissolve and reconfigure old borders and polarities. Such sys-
tems are of various kinds (economic, cultural, technological,
ecological) and are most frequently described in terms of com-
Macalester International Vol. 4
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munications models as made up of “networks,” “webs,” and
“flows” — that is, in terms of the very technologies that have
helped to construct the new world of which they are part.19
Jameson has criticized efforts to depict the global order as
“some immense communicational and computer network.”20 I
agree with him. These models, he asserts, are “distorted figura-
tions” of something deeper, something as yet very hard to
grasp: the world system of multinational capital. In this respect,
we are in much the same position as were theorists of modernity
like Marx and Weber, who strove to map and conceptualize the
expansion of capital and the new worlds it conjured up. We also
strain to follow the pathways of a monetary system that appears
suddenly to be much more abstract and mobile; to register the
reach of the market into enclaves hitherto set off, in whole or in
part, from the relentless reach of the commodity — into non-
Western and former statist economies, and into relatively insu-
lated realms in our own being, where human organs are now for
sale and wombs are for rent.21
Central to the era of multinational capital, and hence to its
distinctive social effects, is the rise of a transnational monetary
system to replace its international predecessor. Joel Kurtzman
has argued that the growth of a global electronic economy —
based on an “electronic commons” in which virtual money and
commodities may be exchanged instantly via an unregulated
world computer network — has shattered the financial and pro-
ductive integrity of nation-states.22 In particular, it has eroded
their monopolistic control over the money supply, their ability
to contain wealth within borders, and their power to levy taxes
on citizens and corporations. As Kurtzman puts it, the “func-
tional economic unit becomes the world instead of the nation-
state,” and countries are drawn into a global workshop and
economy.23 The division of labor now spans the planet, turning
whole countries into the sweatshops or migrant labor forces of
others, others who seem to live by consumption alone. Class
relations have become so dispersed as to be invisible; few prod-
ucts or transactions are purely “national” anymore. If goods are
the bearers of encapsulated worlds, as Mauss and Marx insisted,
most things we buy today are icons of multinationalism. For
translocal corporations, their “offshore” bases increasingly
bypassing established capitals, can move production around the
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world almost at will. They can also evade monopoly and envi-
ronmental controls and the effects of organized labor. To wit,
the forces of global capital, Robert Ross claims, now determine
state policy, causing governments to restrain regulations, cut
taxes, and subsidize corporate production with public funds.24
The effect of all this is to undermine the sovereignty of states
and the wealth of nations. The rhetoric of the market increas-
ingly dictates the terms of national politics, with leaders of all
political parties vying with one another to balance budgets, pare
welfare costs, and privatize public services. Nations derive ever
greater proportions of their revenues from sources like lotteries
and the sale of heritage; citizens are redefined as patriotic con-
sumers (“Buy British”). Government itself becomes a dirty
word, and many Westerners are now strongly suspicious of it.
Some even set out to destroy it. New political-economic confed-
erations, such as the European Union (EU) and NAFTA, are fur-
ther subserviating sovereign polities to broader market
considerations. As European countries struggle variously with
the impact of the EU, their elites tend to compensate for reduced
authority with more strident national chauvinism. Meanwhile,
marginalized regional groups (Scottish, Flemish, Basque) now
see prospects of independence beyond old hegemonies.
While the dislocation of local and national identities might
seem liberating to some, others find them disconcerting. Ordi-
nary people often express their dis-ease with such shifts in terms
of the rather mundane practices that once secured more
enclosed, familiar worlds. In England over the past year, for
instance, many have voiced distress at the idea of losing their
national currency. In December 1995, a talk-show participant on
BBC Radio 4 drew implicitly on three interconnected notions of
the “sovereign” — coin, king, and country — when she asked
anxiously, “If we have to adopt European money, whose head
will be on our pennies?” Here once again is the problem of fix-
ing the state in exemplary human form, the problem of the
South African portrait in another guise. Whose head will it be?
Sovereigns, sovereignty. Heads on coins, heads of state. All of a
piece, all falling to pieces. Or so it seemed to those Euro-chal-
lenged English subjects.
The mobility of money, manufacture, and markets across
national borders has also caused rapid reallocations of employ-
Macalester International Vol. 4
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ment opportunities over the globe, encouraging large-scale
human migrations. This, too, has had profound effects on the
constitution of “countries” and their connection to their inhabi-
tants. Translocal communities have grown greatly in strength
and cohesiveness in recent decades. Far-flung, assertive diaspo-
ras (African, Islamic, Sikh, Jewish, Cuban) complicate the very
idea of the nation as a homogeneous “body” of people within a
continuous terrain, or, for that matter, of “citizenship” as a form
of undivided allegiance. In many contexts, minorities make up
ever larger fractions of the majority, and institutions of public
culture espouse “multicultural” and “polyethnic” solutions to
problems of collective representation. Along with this, there has
developed a preoccupation with universal human rights and so-
called “world citizenship.”25 For many workers today live per-
manently translocal lives: people wait on tables in Chicago to
support families in the Yucatán, mind children in Milan to build
homes in the Philippine countryside, tend the sick in Johannes-
burg to secure retirement in Uganda. Globetrotting brokers and
cosmopolitan intellectuals create novel cultural hybrids and
demonstrate the virtues of an existence beyond partisan tradi-
tions.26 And virtues there surely are, especially for those of us
who travel by choice and in relative comfort. The racial/ethnic
mix of many current “national” sports teams are living instances
of a marriage of convenience between patriotic chauvinism and
the world market in migrant athletes.
But multiculturalism, like the concern with universal rights,
often fails to engage underlying structures of inequality and
exploitation that are themselves global in scale. As unbalanced
wealth and resources drive the poor toward more prosperous
centers, (“First World”) governments become preoccupied by
illegal immigration, raising the specter of dwindling employ-
ment, welfare scrounging, and cultural dilution. At the same
time, the global economy has so radically restructured the labor
market in advanced industrial societies that workers everywhere
are now being made to compete with the most exploitative pro-
ductive contexts in the world. Once denounced as examples of
oriental despotism, the profitable “tiger economies” are now
hailed by many Western industrialists as models of efficiency.
In the United States, the move of manufacture “offshore” or
south of the border has rendered entire communities redundant
Jean Comaroff
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and all workers insecure (a point powerfully made in the recent
New York Times series “The Downsizing of America”).27 As the
remaining work force becomes more feminized, youthful, part
time, and low paid, sizable sectors of our population must con-
template life without the kind of jobs that once created a sense of
self and place. For most of us are products of a world in which
labor remains the major source of value and status—but a world
in which full-time, long-term employment is also a thing of the
past. Instead, various twilight economies have burgeoned. Yet
these, like the forms of contract work that are now so prevalent
in all sectors of the economy, often deny the experience of per-
manence and coexistence that once underpinned our sense of
moral community and local context. New forms of association
have arisen, from health clubs and youth gangs to a host of new,
often intensely materialistic, world-transforming religions. The
kinds of social imaginary they will foster remains to be seen.
Globalization, then, has complex material bases; as Jameson
insists, it is not made of ether alone. As I noted earlier, however,
new communication technologies have been crucial instruments
in reconfiguring the contours of the world; all the more so when
these technologies are viewed as a planetary “ecumene,” a
domain of cultural interaction and exchange.28 Not only do dis-
tant populations consume the same CNN soundbites, the same
American, Brazilian, or Australian soaps, but the satellite signals
beamed to their dishes evade control — control once exercised
by states and governments—over flows of images and informa-
tion, flows integral to the creation of collective consciousness
and national “publics.” Anderson has argued persuasively that
the monitoring and translation of “news” into local idiom were
significant in producing an imagined community, in evoking a
sense of national culture and a shared “simultaneity through
time.”29 Global media, on the other hand, tend to operate at the
level of the most common symbolic denominator on a world-
wide scale, most often in English.
This does not mean that their images lack meaning in local
terms. I shall argue the very opposite. But, as Hannerz has
observed, translocal cultural traffic does tend to ignore, dis-
solve, or devalue national boundaries.30 Its media often lack the
contextual cues that situate local experience in wider sociopoliti-
cal communities, that make a particular place out of unbounded
Macalester International Vol. 4
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space—a place, that is, other than urban America, which is often
more familiar to consumers elsewhere than much of their own
countries. Sometimes this very quality can be put to liberating
effect: South African youth drew on the culture of the black
American inner city to imagine a world beyond the reach of the
apartheid state. But their disengagement from the local moral
community has also proved resistant to the efforts of the new
regime to capture their hearts and minds. As this suggests, in
the postcolonial era, cultural flows draw complex maps whose
borders defy old center-periphery schemes, and exist more in
electronic than in geographical space. The new centers are pulse
points in complex networks or are sites of world-scale image
production (Los Angeles, Atlanta, São Paulo, Dakar) rather than
the capitals of nation-states.
The expansion of media such as electronic mail has exacer-
bated the production of spaces with virtual (and hence, virtually
no) boundaries. True, the relative cheapness and flexibility of
the Internet have inspired varied sorts of communal uses and
have made it a favorite with politicians trying to reconcile
democracy with the free market. Remember the Electronic Town
Hall? But the nature of the medium seems to be more suited to
dreams of libertarian enterprise untrammeled by state censor-
ship or regulation (as recent examples of high-tech neo-Nazi
militia networks confirm).
And so we return directly to the reconstruction of the world
in this Age of Revolution. As I have tried to show, the era of
global capital has seen the erosion of both the legitimacy of sov-
ereign states and their capacity to localize the manufacture of
value and meaning. As the division of labor is dispersed across
the earth, national economies and/or polities are superseded as
tangible terrains on which production, exchange, and consump-
tion exist in close connection to one another. Here, then, is the
point: There has arisen a palpable discrepancy between the way
we in the West think about “society” and the way in which we
currently experience it. For our conceptual categories — our
notions of moral community, personhood, identity — owe their
origins to the ascendance of the nation-state and to the kinds of
arrangement contained within it. In popular perception we have
tended to envisage Western society (and also its “non-Western”
opposites) in terms of national political economies and intellec-
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tual patrimonies. And within the social sciences, too, concepts of
“the social order” and “culture” have been largely synonymous
with territorially defined polities.31 But, for all the reasons given,
none of these concepts, molded in the cradle of Euro-modernity,
will do any longer. Our selves and worlds are in the grip of
forces whose outlines we only partially see, forces that
ambiguate prevailing categories but as yet offer few alterna-
tives, few, at least, that link vast impersonal mechanisms to situ-
ated people and their moral concerns.
Of course, not all that was solid has melted into air. Or ether.
The complexity of the current moment lies not in the fact that it
is definitively postmodern, postindustrial, or post-anything else.
Instead, it combines core features of the modern world in unfa-
miliar, uneasy combinations — speeded up, stretched to the
breaking point, recombined—whose very unfamiliarity is made
plain by market forces of new intensity, new possibility. Nation-
states have not died or even, by and large, withered away,
although there are spaces on the map where they have splin-
tered, where government is in the hands of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), so-called warlords, or corporations. In
short, their nature and their spheres of operation have altered as
they have lost exclusive economic, fiscal, and political control
over their domains. They have also, Appadurai notes, relin-
quished their monopoly over the idea of the “nation” itself.32
That idea is now espoused by all manner of groups that seek
self-realization in the only idiom they know — those of modern
nationhood.
At the same time, states themselves have entered an era of
devolution, privatization, and (in neoconservative-speak)
retraction of rule. In response, they have intensified their efforts
to shore up national patrimony in realms that remain under
their suasion: in place of bread, they offer such circuses as public
spectacles, monuments, gladiatorial sports; in place of import
controls, they police immigration; in place of a politics of pro-
duction, they obsess over the politics of population and repro-
duction. Thus government becomes ever more embroiled in
patrolling borders and controlling access to abortion, its rhetoric
linking bodies politic to bodies personal by way of the idioms of
health, sexual orientation, family values, and the rights of the
unborn. As if to confirm this, a “quality” British newspaper
Macalester International Vol. 4
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recently coined a cover image to accompany an article on the
constitution of nation in the next century (“Birth of the New
Republic”). It pictured a fetus nestling at the heart of a large
Union Jack (see Plate 1).33 Here, again, the so-called postmodern
replays, albeit with a novel emphasis, long-standing modernist
themes — like the tendency to root nationality in nature and in
the essence of the human form.34
III. Globalization and Nation-State
This leads us back to the portrait of the (as yet) unknown South
African and to the issues it raises with respect to ethnicity,
nationalism, and the politics of identity.
The interplay between globalization and the nation-state has
spawned two simultaneous, interrelated processes, both of
which I have already mentioned. The first is the effort of govern-
ments to redress breaches of sovereignty by reasserting their
control and presence in registers they still command, from patri-
otic spectacles to biopolitics. The second, exacerbated by world-
wide movements of peoples and cultures, is an increasingly
urgent assertion of difference, an explosion of ethnic and other
forms of identity politics within and across national communi-
ties. It was precisely these two tendencies that ran up against
one another in the matter of the South African portrait. The prior
question, however, is how did they come to coexist in the first
place?
Several answers have been posited. Perhaps the most com-
mon is that expressions of ethnic and religious difference are
assertions of persisting primordial sentiments among those
whose passage to rational modernity has somehow been
impeded by history — people like fundamentalists, tribalists, or
survivors of the Soviet Empire. Others suggest the reverse, but
invoke the same evolutionary logic: that the global economy has
dissolved local identities everywhere, but rather than rejoice in
universal civilization, many “chafe at becoming just another
interchangeable part” of a world market and manifest a “new
‘tribalism.’ ”35 Hence the florescence of ethnic consciousness all
over, from East Africa to Central Europe and North America.
Neither of these positions is tenable. In the first place, both
alike treat ethnic assertion (with its claims to difference) and the
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spread of modernity (with its homogenizing effects) as if each
described a distinct, exclusive phase of history, a teleological
stage in human development. Yet all the evidence shows not
only that the two often coexist, but also that they are reciprocally
defining features of the same historical moment. As this implies,
ethnic consciousness is not the preserve of the premodern: those
who profess it tend to do so in fairly standard and recognizably
modernist terms—terms whose currency has been coined by the
imprint of the contemporary world. As this implies, too, ethnic-
ity is less an essence than a relation,36 sharing strong family
resemblances with other forms of distinguishing identity in
advanced capitalist societies. Nor, by extension, is its assertion
an atavistic response to homogenization. Few ethnicized popu-
lations actually withdraw from the global economy; a large
number (like Zulu Inkatha supporters, Scottish Nationalists, or
Canadian Québecois) seek more independent and equitable
access to it. Far from arising out of a spreading sense of same-
ness, their self-awareness is owed to a particular, culturally situ-
ated take on the new world order, one that tries to make sense of
why a market that is “free” and rights that are “universal” yield
so many palpable exclusions and inequalities.
Well, why do they?
The answer has already been anticipated.
Recall. The Enlightenment legacy of human liberty, equality,
and citizenship implied a moral community in the form of the
nation-state within which rights could be exercised and wrongs
redressed. Attachment to this community was invested with
“primordial” emotions, emotions of the sort frequently ascribed,
ironically, to “tribals.” Those emotions, moreover, were
inscribed, à la Foucault, on bodies as well as minds, forging a
deep resonance between self and society. It is just this ensemble
of connections — among national communities and the con-
sciousness they produce among right-bearing, embodied citi-
zens and their primal sentiments — that global forces are
undermining. In these circumstances political elites tend to
make ever more emotive, chauvinist appeals to national her-
itage, appeals that, by their very nature, further attenuate the
position of the marginal. That the politics of difference, fostered
by the “postmodern” condition, should be mobilized along
those very fault lines would seem overdetermined: they offer
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those excluded from the national imaginary alternative means
and ends, alternative forms of moral community, envisaged in
similarly visceral terms.37 This is why ethnic movements replay
the themes of modern nationalism in a discordant key, challeng-
ing states with their own stifled contradictions.
Let me stress how this view differs from the ones I mentioned
a moment ago. In insisting on the modernity of contemporary
forms of ethnicity, I obviously part company with those who
explain the phenomenon in primordialist terms. In this, I echo
the arguments of many others — although primordialism per-
sists both in popular and scholarly discourse, perhaps because it
resonates with the sentiments of many ethnic movements. But it
is also insufficient merely to proclaim that ethnicity is a social
construction. In order to account for its currency in the here-
and-now, we have to explore its relation to prevailing social and
material conditions; for, I repeat, it is a relational phenomenon, a
product of the place of particular peoples in a populous world.
Globalization and localization are two sides of the same coin,
two dimensions of the same historical movement. For the
transnational flow of goods and images demands their domesti-
cation, a process through which they are made relevant to
parochial projects and everyday lives. As anthropologists have
long insisted, there is no such thing as a universal symbol or
icon, notwithstanding the fact that ever more signs circulate
through the universe each day.
Meaning is always translated into vernacular terms, even if
the act of translation modifies the terms themselves. That much
was learned by those purveyors of planetary platitudes, Ameri-
can ad men, who discovered some years ago that the slogan
“Coke Adds Life” is rendered in Chinese as “Coke Brings the
Ancestors Back from the Dead.” The very experience of globalism
creates and re-creates a specific awareness of the local. It is this
that gives texture to efforts to refigure moral communities;
indeed, to refigure the nature of society itself. It explains why
ethnic movements, far from eschewing translocal signs and
commodities, often deploy them, brilliantly, in assertions of pri-
mordial tradition; why Andean folk dress is made of imported
polyester fiber,38 or Gangsta Rap has become a pulsing medium
of “colored” identity politics in Cape Town.39
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The newly animated politics of identity, in other words, is the
sum of a compromised nationhood, often patriotically on the
defensive, and a rising sense of local difference. The latter con-
jures with both the self-assertion and the contradictions of the
state, typically taking the form of ethno-nationalism. Not all eth-
nic movements are nationalist, of course.40 But there seems to be
a growing convergence in the late twentieth century between
ethnic consciousness and nationalist claims.41 Other forms of
identity also borrow national terms with which to imagine
themselves (Queer Nation, Hip Hop Nation, the Nation of
Islam). For, anachronistic though it may be, nationalism remains
the prevailing political idiom, the predominant way of con-
ceiving relations of subject and society in our world. Ethno-
nationalism, however, differs from modernist Euro- or univer-
sal-nationalism, Tambiah42 and others have noted, partly
because it is often the product — at least, initially — of struggle
against the hegemony (and inherent ambiguities) of the Western
nation-state. It is also a product of sociohistorical conditions
unlike those pertaining to Europe, 1789 – 1848. What it envis-
ages, I reiterate, is an alternative modernity, a late modernity
that seeks to fashion moral communities in the global market-
place.
Perhaps, as Deane has said, all nationalisms exhibit a measure
of “metaphysical essentialism.”43 But Euro-nationalism, born of
an assertively humanist era—posits a territorially bounded, sec-
ular state founded on putatively worldwide principles of citi-
zenship and social contract. Human differences — most notably
race and gender — might qualify these universals but should
never cancel them out. Although such citizenship was, and is, a
matter of committed bodies, even souls, one need not be born a
national. It is possible to become a “naturalized” member of the
polity by a voluntary act of commitment. (Colonial “outposts”
have always complicated this imaginary, of course, but that is
another story.) Ethno-nationalism, in contrast, is primarily a
matter of birth and blood, and occasionally of conversion and
intermarriage. Ethno-nationalists may or may not root them-
selves in idealized homelands; some such lands, like the Sikh
Khalistan, are territories of a hopeful imagination. Their sphere
of allegiance is often virtual, being vested in strong, active dias-
poras that stretch across existing states and borders. Ethno-
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nationalism, above all, celebrates cultural particularity, which is
often explicitly religious in inspiration and charter. Ironically,
while they frequently reject humanist universals, these move-
ments still rely on certain de facto commonalities (among them,
the global salience of cultural difference) to do business in the
world.
As I have drawn them here, the two nationalisms are ideolog-
ical types, not historical realities. For a start, universal- or Euro-
nationalism is not confined to Europe. And several self-styled
“European” nations, past and present, have assumed many of
the features of ethno-nationalism (Israel, for instance, which has
been hailed as inspiration by South African ethno-nationalists of
all colors). The converse is also true; separatists with ambition
tend to embrace many of the forms of the modernist nation-
state. Both are capable of giving rise to hideous violence in the
name of the collectivity; and while states often define their vio-
lence as legitimate — as opposed to “terrorist” or insurgent —
force, cases like Northern Ireland; KwaZulu, Natal; and Sri
Lanka show how difficult it may be to distinguish between the
two. Those who subscribe to one form of nationalism roundly
condemn the other: ethno-nationalists are portrayed as primi-
tive, fanatical, and dangerous; Euro-nationalists are accused of
mouthing global platitudes in defense of long-established privi-
lege, espousing “amorphous nonracism and common human-
ity” (as a self-identified, South African “black communicator”
recently put it)44 to protect neocolonial interests.
Exchanges of this sort are common these days, not least
because most polities are actually “hetero-nationalist,”45 i.e.,
hybrids that seek to reconcile ethnic identity politics with a
Euro-nationalist conception of civil society. Speaking the lan-
guage of “pluralism,” such formations try to accommodate cul-
tural diversity within a community of autonomous, legally
undifferentiated citizens — whose rights include the freedom to
assert difference. The United States, which combines a strong
republican tradition with a rich immigrant past and marked eco-
nomic disparities, has become the epicenter of present-day het-
ero-nationalism. The mix encourages “multiculturalism” but
has also resulted in bitter disputes wherever individual rights
run up against group entitlements, especially to public
resources and the means of political and cultural representation.
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The “argument of images” captured in the “People’s Por-
traits” exhibition was an aesthetic expression of this same ten-
sion. In South Africa, the long, hard struggle for a
European-style democracy finally triumphed at the very
moment when the Euro-nationalist ideal, and the ideological
scaffolding that held it in place, was being destabilized on a
worldwide scale. Here, as in the former USSR and Central
Europe, battles are now being fought between modernist and
ethno-nationalist forces. Bitter battles. Also revealing ones. For,
if ethno-nationalists have revivified the very principles of racial
and cultural difference that were the stock-in-trade of apartheid,
they have also laid bare the dark, divisive underside of Euro-
nationalism itself, especially in its colonial and postcolonial
manifestations.
The dangers of these confrontations are now seared on our
awareness. At their most extreme, they replay a thoroughly con-
temporary Heart of Darkness horror: the nightmare of difference
seeking to prevail by (literally) disembodying humanity.46 In
claiming right by means of might, such desperate measures
promise to entrench, not erase, prevailing structures of disad-
vantage. More than this, identity politics, even in its more
benign forms, reproduces critical features of the culture of the
world-as-marketplace. Its ideology is one of assertion and enti-
tlement, of the “me generation” extended to the “we genera-
tion.”47 The group, here, is less an inclusive totality — where a
common denominator grounds difference and admits other dis-
tinctions—than the sum of individual self-interest. Whatever its
mythic charter, the sectarian struggles of our age often echo the
clarion call of free enterprise: in the words of Margaret Thatcher,
“There is no such thing as society.”
One last corollary is especially significant: the language of
identity politics cannot adequately address the history of its
own making. Nor can it explain itself in terms other than its own
ideology. As a result, it obscures and mystifies the very
processes that continue to marginalize many peoples and to
widen the gap between privilege and privation on a planetary
scale. A UN survey published in July 1996, for example, found
that “an emerging global elite . . . interconnected in a variety of
ways, is amassing great wealth and power, while more than half
of humanity is left out.” Among its conclusions was the observa-
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tion that “the wealthiest and the poorest people — both within
and among countries — are living in increasingly separate
worlds.”48 It is not surprising, then, that humanist universals
seem less and less plausible in subjective terms. Yet the politics
of identity tend to take separation and difference as the prime
mover of (post? neo?) modern history, thereby neglecting the
very (general) forces that separate and differentiate in the first
place: the forces of economic exploitation and political disem-
powerment inflected in gender and generation, race and ethnic-
ity, culture and class.
IV. Identity in the “New” South Africa
Let me return, one last time, to South Africa, where these conun-
drums are currently much in evidence.
Here, several constituencies pursue ethno-nationalist politics
in the name of primordial difference. Most conspicuous among
them are conservative white Afrikaners and the Zulu Inkatha
Freedom Party. Both have struggled hard to ensure that the
principle of ethnic sovereignty be inscribed in the constitution of
the post-apartheid nation-state. Three points of comparative
salience may be distilled from their efforts. (1) Both groups have
continued to conduct their campaigns along lines of ethnic and
racial division — even, for certain purposes, making common
cause across racial lines to do so. The so-called Freedom Front
emerged in the early 1990s as a unity of various ethnic sepa-
ratists, black and white, against the integrative politics of both
the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party.49
(2) There has been sustained violence as all-or-none distinctions
have been reinscribed onto human flesh; the targets have been
those who ambiguate sociopolitical contrasts, like Afrikaner lib-
erals or Zulu ANC supporters, whose homes and families have
been subject to special violation.50 (3) The objective of these
ethno-nationalists has been to secure group entitlements rather
than universal human or civic rights; the predicament of those
marginalized by poverty, age, or gender receives little mention.
The nonracial ANC, conversely, has always sought to tran-
scend ethnicity. In its view, “tribalism,” if not actually a colonial
creation, was exploited and elaborated by imperial policies of
“divide and rule.” The “new” South Africa was to be a social
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democracy, an unashamedly modernist Euro-nation51 whose
birth was long delayed by apartheid. Too long delayed, as it
turned out. In the late twentieth century, a post-apartheid state
could not remain indifferent to difference.52 Along with strident
Afrikaner and Zulu nationalist movements, a host of other
groups (Xhosa, Sotho, Tswana, Coloured, Griqua, Muslim) have
begun to press for collective rights, often looking to American
identity politics for models. Are these movements to be seen as a
residue of colonialism? Or as the legitimate claims of people in a
historically diverse society? In light of this dilemma, the ANC,
now in government, has been forced to rethink the whole ques-
tion of culture and ethnicity along familiar, hetero-nationalist
lines. Celebrations of distinctive traditions, long frowned on by
many who struggled against apartheid, are now freely indulged
in, encouraged in no small measure by an expanding tourist
market.
Is it any wonder, under the circumstances, that those
entrusted with the nation’s culture find it impossible to put a
face on “the” new South African? Or that South Africans them-
selves find the question of who they are, the question of social
membership or “identity,” to be problematic in unprecedented,
unexpected ways? Under apartheid, the state was enclosed by
an ideology that imposed stark, and starkly different, subject
positions — although it portrayed itself in the language of mod-
ernist nationhood, a language familiar to its “First World” allies.
The unmaking of the Afrikaner state, on the other hand, was
played out in parallel with the rise of the new global era. Its
death throes occurred amidst internal resistance assisted not
only by international campaigns but by the same large-scale,
transnational forces that dissolved the lines of the Cold War
map. The new South Africa was born into a universe of altered
alignments and compromised sovereignties, fleeing capital,
worldwide recession, and eroding national wealth.
Now the neophyte government struggles to balance a socialist
legacy with the dictates of the global market, to reconcile vocal
unions and a volatile, expectant populace with privatization and
foreign investment.53 In the space between optimism and fore-
boding, no single language has yet emerged with which to
speak about the country’s ironic history and present location,
both in Africa and in the wider postcolonial world. Ethnic poli-
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tics, with its unambiguous identities and its zero-sum logic of
victimization and triumph, are beginning to fill the silence. The
plausibility of the Euro-modernist model, couched in hopes of
social improvement, has been undercut by contracting state ser-
vices, persisting inequality, and rising unemployment. Mean-
while, the “rainbow nation” is tenuously bound by a sense of its
own miraculous rebirth, by the charisma of Nelson Mandela,
and by the short-lived effervescence of tele-triumphalism and
sporting spectacles. But it is also threatened by forces that sub-
vert the very experience of society as a shared moral order, of
humanity as a common denominator, of the nation as a nonpar-
tisan guardian of civic interests.
V. Conclusion
Essays of this sort in an earlier, atomic age, ended with calls to
see the light in the eleventh hour.54 In this, the anomic age, our
predicament is less susceptible to hard-edged heroics. Not that
urgent, heartfelt appeals are not made in our time, but they are
more likely to advocate acts of conscious political resolve: “Let
the globalists step aside,” write Connelly and Kennedy. “One-
world solutions do not work. Local solutions will.”55 Benjamin
Barber is of similar mind: “Democrats need to seek out indige-
nous democratic impulses,” he notes, although he cautions
against quick-fix solutions. “[D]emocracy in a hurry,” he
observes, “often looks something like France in 1794 or China in
1989.”56
I would urge us to be less hasty still, to think beyond this well-
intentioned vision for a brave new McWorld. For ours is a uni-
verse more fitting to the imagination of Lewis Carroll than
George Orwell; one that requires more than mere rearrange-
ment of the pieces in our existing global game. For the nature of
the play has changed before our very eyes: the board has
expanded beyond recognition, the mallets have become flamin-
goes, the balls fly about at an alarming pace, and the stately sov-
ereigns have all but vanished. Under these conditions, and in
the absence of a universally acknowledged referee, it is not clear
whether those in the field are all part of the same action, or hold
much shared idea of the contest and its rules. It is our task, then,
to make some sense of this field with enough imagination to
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grasp its absurdities and novel moves, and enough realism to
relate them to our known past and our possible futures. To
infuse our understanding and collective will with the boldness,
complexity, and historical vision that the moment demands.
Notes
1. This essay owes much to ideas developed in collaboration with John L.
Comaroff, especially those first set out in John L. Comaroff, “Ethnicity, Nation-
alism, and the Politics of Difference in an Age of Revolution,” in Perspectives on
Nationalism and War, ed. John L. Comaroff and P. C. Stern (Luxembourg: Gor-
don & Breach, 1994).
2. James W. Fernandez, Bwiti: An Ethnography of the Religious Imagination in
Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 555.
3. Jane Taylor, People’s Portraits: Some Meditations on Identity, n.p., 4.
4. Ibid., 1–2.
5. Salman Rushdie, The Moor’s Last Sigh (London: Vintage, 1996), 329.
6. Benjamin R. Barber, “Jihad vs. McWorld” in Atlantic 269, no. 3 (March 1992):
53–63.
7. Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy” in Atlantic 273, no. 2 (February
1994): 44-65; and Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy, “Must It Be the Rest
against the West?” in Atlantic 274, no. 6 (December 1994): 61–73.
8. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” in Foreign Affairs 72, no.
3 (1993): 22–49.
9. Comaroff, “Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Difference”; and John
L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colo-
nialism, and Consciousness in South Africa, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, forthcoming).
10. Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, 1789 – 1848 (New York: New
American Library [Mentor Book], 1962), 19.
11. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
12. E.g., Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State Forma-
tion as Cultural Revolution (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).
13. Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism, trans. J. De Bres (London: Verso, 1978); and
Fredric Jameson, “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” in
New Left Review 146 (1984): 53–92.
14. Comaroff, “Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Difference.”
15. Cf. Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (Lon-
don: Sage, 1992), 6 and 58f.
16. Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays,
trans. W. Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 128f.
17. Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York: New York Uni-
versity Press, 1975).
Jean Comaroff
141
04/07/97  08:03 AM      0907com2.qxd
18. John Carlos Rowe, et al., The Forces of Globalization. Statement of a Research
Project (1995-98) of the Critical Theory Institute, University of California,
Irvine, 3.
19. Ibid., 2; and Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global
Cultural Economy” in Public Culture 2 (1990): 1–24.
20. Jameson, “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” 79 f.
21. Jean Comaroff, “Contentious Subjects: Moral Being in the Modern World”
(Eleventh Westermarck Memorial Lecture, 1993) in Suomen Antropologi 19, no.
2 (1994): 2–17.
22. Joel Kurtzman, The Death of Money: How the Electronic Economy Has Destabi-
lized the World’s Markets and Created Financial Chaos (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1993), 85f and 214f.
23. Ibid., 214.
24. Robert J. S. Ross, “The Relative Decline of Relative Autonomy: Global Cap-
italism and the Political Economy of State Change,” in Changes in the State:
Causes and Consequences, ed. E. S. Greenberg and T. F. Mayer (Newbury Park,
Calif.: Sage, 1990), 211.
25. Robertson, Globalization, 59.
26. Edward W. Said, Representations of the Intellectual (London: Vintage, 1994).
27. “The Downsizing of America,” New York Times, 3–9 March 1996.
28. Igor Kopytoff, “The Internal African Frontier: The Making of African Cul-
ture,” in The African Frontier, ed. Igor Kopytoff (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
sity Press, 1987), 10; and Ulf Hannerz, “Notes on the Global Ecumene” in
Public Culture 1 (1989): 66.
29. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 63.
30. Hannerz, “Notes on the Global Ecumene,” 70.
31. Cf. Akhil Gupta, “The Song of the Nonaligned World: Transnational Identi-
ties and the Reinscription of Space in Late Capitalism” in Cultural Anthropology
7 (1992): 63–79.
32. Arjun Appadurai, “Identity, Uncertainty, and Secret Agency: Ethnic Vio-
lence in the Era of Globalization.” Lecture delivered at the Chicago Humani-
ties Institute, 28 November 1995, 3.
33. “Birth of the New Republic,” Guardian, 9 January 1995, sec. 2.
34. Cf. Appadurai, “Identity, Uncertainty, and Secret Agency,” 2.
35. Kurtzman, The Death of Money, 214.
36. John L. Comaroff, “Of Totemism and Ethnicity: Consciousness, Practice,
and the Signs of Inequality” in Ethnos 52 (1987): 301–23.
37. Appadurai, “Identity, Uncertainty, and Secret Agency.”
38. Rebecca J. Tolen, Wool and Synthetics, Countryside and City: Dress, Race, and
History in Chimborazo, Highland Ecuador. Doctoral dissertation, University of
Chicago, 1995.
39. Abdou M. Simone, In the Mix: Retaking Coloured Identities (Cape Town:
Foundation for Contemporary Research, 1994); and Shannon Jackson, Youth
Macalester International Vol. 4
142
04/07/97  08:03 AM      0907com2.qxd
Culture, Race, and Coloureds: An Investigation into the Politics of Identity in South
Africa. Doctoral dissertation proposal, Department of Anthropology, Univer-
sity of Chicago, June 1995.
40. Crawford M. Young, “The Dialectics of Cultural Pluralism: Concept and
Reality,” in Etnichnost’ i Vlast’ v Polietnichnyh Gosudarstvah (Ethnicity and
Power in Multiethnic States), ed. V. Tishkov (Moscow: Nauka, 1994). Pub-
lished in Russian; English version in manuscript.
41. Cf. Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today” in
Anthropology Today 8 (1992): 4.
42. Stanley Tambiah, “Ethnic Conflict and Democratization,” in Etnichnost’ i
Vlast’ v Polietnichnyh Gosudarstvah.
43. Seamus Deane, introduction to Nationalism, Colonialism, and Literature, ed.
Terry Eagleton, Fredric Jameson, and Edward W. Said (Minneapolis: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 1990), 9.
44. Sandile Memela, “How Do You Know the Real Black Communicators?” in
Star and South African Times, 25 October 1995, 12. In a fascinating parallel case,
Tswana ethnic nationalists in the early 1990s dismissed the ANC as merely the
tool of “the Xhosa ethnic group.” Michael Lawrence and Andres Manson, “The
‘Dog of the Boers’: The Rise and Fall of Mangope of Bophuthatswana” in Jour-
nal of Southern African Studies 20, no. 3 (1994): 459.
45. Comaroff, “Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Difference.”
46. Ibid.; and cf. Appadurai, “Identity, Uncertainty, and Secret Agency.”
47. Comaroff, “Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Difference.”
48. Barbara Crossette, “UN Finds Separate Worlds of Rich and Poor Widen-
ing,” International Herald Tribune, 16 July 1996, 6.
49. Lawrence and Manson, “The ‘Dog of the Boers,’” 459.
50. Cf. Appadurai, “Identity, Uncertainty, and Secret Agency.”
51. Hobsbawm, “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today,” 4.
52. Comaroff, “Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Difference.”
53. Of Nelson Mandela’s state visit to Britain in July 1996, Anthony Sampson
wrote, “It was at the Bank [of England] that Mandela most candidly explained
. . . his overall political strategy, of converting the unions to privatization and
disarming radical opponents by showing the benefits of foreign investment.”
Observer, 14 July 1996, 17.
54. John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, “Postcolonial Politics and Discourses
of Democracy in Southern Africa” in Journal of Anthropological Research (forth-
coming, 1997).
55. Connelly and Kennedy, “Must It Be the Rest against the West?”, 91.
56. Barber, “Jihad vs. McWorld,” 63.
Jean Comaroff
143
